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Abstract
In this paper, we present a Byzantine fault tolerant dis-
tributed commit protocol for transactions running over un-
trusted networks. The traditional two-phase commit proto-
col is enhanced by replicating the coordinator and by run-
ning a Byzantine agreement algorithm among the coordi-
nator replicas. Our protocol can tolerate Byzantine faults
at the coordinator replicas and a subset of malicious faults
at the participants. A decision certificate, which includes a
set of registration records and a set of votes from partici-
pants, is used to facilitate the coordinator replicas to reach
a Byzantine agreement on the outcome of each transaction.
The certificate also limits the ways a faulty replica can use
towards non-atomic termination of transactions, or seman-
tically incorrect transaction outcomes.
Keywords: Distributed Transaction, Two Phase Commit,
Fault Tolerance, Byzantine Agreement, Web Services
1. Introduction
The two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [8] is a standard
distributed commit protocol [12] for distributed transac-
tions. The 2PC protocol is designed with the assumptions
that the coordinator and the participants are subject only to
benign faults, and the coordinator can be recovered quickly
if it fails. Consequently, the 2PC protocol does not work
if the coordinator is subject to arbitrary faults (also known
as Byzantine faults [10]) because a faulty coordinator might
send conflicting decisions to different participants. Unfor-
tunately, with more and more distributed transactions run-
ning over the untrusted Internet, driven by the need for busi-
ness integration and collaboration, and enabled by the latest
Web-based technologies such as Web services, it is a realis-
tic threat that cannot be ignored.
This problem is first addressed by Mohan et al. in [11] by
integrating Byzantine agreement and the 2PC protocol. The
basic idea is to replace the second phase of the 2PC pro-
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tocol with a Byzantine agreement among the coordinator,
the participants, and some redundant nodes within the root
cluster (where the root coordinator resides). This prevents
the coordinator from disseminating conflicting transaction
outcomes to different participants without being detected.
However, this approach has a number of deficiencies. First,
it requires all members of the root cluster, including partici-
pants, to reach a Byzantine agreement for each transaction.
This would incur very high overhead if the size of the cluster
is large. Second, it does not offer Byzantine fault tolerance
protection for subordinate coordinators or participants out-
side the root cluster. Third, it requires the participants in the
root cluster to know all other participants in the same clus-
ter, which prevents dynamic propagation of transactions. In
general, only the coordinator should have the knowledge of
the participants set for each transaction. These problems
prevent this approach from being used in practical systems.
Rothermel et al. [13] addressed the challenges of en-
suring atomic distributed commit in open systems where
participants (which may also serve as subordinate coor-
dinators) may be compromised. However, [13] assumes
that the root coordinator is trusted, which limits its useful-
ness. Garcia-Molina et al. [6] discussed the circumstances
when Byzantine agreement is needed for distributed trans-
action processing. Gray [7] compared the problems of dis-
tributed commit and Byzantine agreement, and provided in-
sight on the commonality and differences between the two
paradigms.
In this paper, we carefully analyze the threats to atomic
commitment of distributed transactions and evaluate strate-
gies to mitigate such threats. We choose to use a Byzan-
tine agreement algorithm only among the coordinator repli-
cas, which avoids the problems in [11]. An obvious candi-
date for the Byzantine agreement algorithm is the Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT) algorithm described in [5] because
of its efficiency. However, the BFT algorithm is designed
to ensure totally ordered atomic multicast for requests to a
replicated stateful server. We made a number of modifica-
tions to the algorithm so that it fits the problem of atomic
distributed commit. The most crucial change is made to the
first phase of the BFT algorithm, where the primary coordi-
nator replica is required to use a decision certificate, which
is a collection of the registration records and the votes it
has collected from the participants, to back its decision on a
transaction’s outcome. The use of such a certificate is essen-
tial to enable a correct backup coordinator replica to verify
the primary’s proposal. This also limits the methods that a
faulty replica can use to hinder atomic distributed commit
of a transaction.
We integrated our Byzantine fault tolerant distributed
commit (BFTDC) protocol with Kandula, a well-known
open source distributed commit framework for Web ser-
vices [2]. The framework is an implementation of the Web
Services Atomic Transaction Specification (WS-AT) [4].
The measurements show that our protocol incurs only mod-
erate runtime overhead during normal operations.
2. Background
2.1. Distributed Transactions
A distributed transaction is a transaction that spans
across multiple sites over a computer network. It should
maintain the same ACID properties [8] as a local transac-
tion does. One of the most interesting issues for distributed
transactions is how to guarantee atomicity, i.e., either all op-
erations of the transaction succeed in which case the trans-
action commits, or none of the operations is carried out in
which case the transaction aborts.
The middleware supporting distributed transactions is
often called transaction processing monitors (or TP moni-
tors in short). One of the main services provided by a TP
monitor is a distributed commit service, which guarantees
the atomic termination of distributed transactions. In gen-
eral, the distributed commit service is implemented by the
2PC protocol, a standard distributed commit protocol [12].
According to the 2PC protocol, a distributed transaction
is modelled to contain one coordinator and a number of par-
ticipants. A distributed transaction is initiated by one of the
participants, which is referred to as the initiator. The coor-
dinator is created when the transaction is activated by the
initiator. All participants are required to register with the
coordinator when they get involved with the transaction. As
the name suggests, the 2PC protocol commits a transaction
in two phases. During the first phase (also called prepare
phase), a request is disseminated by the coordinator to all
participants so that they can prepare to commit the trans-
action. If a participant is able to commit the transaction, it
prepares the transaction for commitment and responds with
a “prepared” vote. Otherwise, it votes “aborted”. When
a participant responded with a “prepared” vote, it enters a
“ready” state. Such a participant must be prepared to ei-
ther commit or abort the transaction. A participant that has
not sent a “prepared” vote can unilaterally abort the trans-
action. When the coordinator has received votes from every
participant, or a pre-defined timeout has occurred, it starts
the second phase by notifying the outcome of the transac-
tion. The coordinator decides to commit a transaction only
if it has received the “prepared” vote from every participant
during the first phase. It aborts the transaction otherwise.
2.2. Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Byzantine fault tolerance refers to the capability of a sys-
tem to tolerate Byzantine faults. It can be achieved by repli-
cating the server and by ensuring all server replicas receive
the same input in the same order. The latter means that the
server replicas must reach an agreement on the input despite
Byzantine faulty replicas and clients. Such an agreement is
often referred to as Byzantine agreement [10].
Byzantine agreement algorithms had been too expensive
to be practical until Castro and Liskov invented the BFT
algorithm mentioned earlier [5]. The BFT algorithm is ex-
ecuted by a set of 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate f Byzantine
faulty replicas. One of the replicas is designated as the pri-
mary while the rest are backups. The normal operation of
the BFT algorithm involves three phases. During the first
phase (called pre-prepare phase), the primary multicasts a
pre-prepare message containing the client’s request, the cur-
rent view and a sequence number assigned to the request to
all backups. A backup verifies the request message and the
ordering information. If the backup accepts the message, it
multicasts to all other replicas a prepare message contain-
ing the ordering information and the digest of the request
being ordered. This starts the second phase, i.e., the pre-
pare phase. A replica waits until it has collected 2f match-
ing prepare messages from different replicas before it mul-
ticasts a commit message to other replicas, which starts the
third phase (i.e., commit phase). The commit phase ends
when a replica has received 2f matching commit messages
from other replicas. At this point, the request message has
been totally ordered and it is ready to be delivered to the
server application.
If the primary or the client is faulty, a Byzantine agree-
ment on the order of a request might not be reached, in
which case, a new view is initiated, triggered by a time-
out on the current view. A different primary is designated
in a round-robin fashion for each new view installed.
3. BFT Distributed Commit
3.1. System Models
We consider transactional client/server applications sup-
ported by an object-based TP monitor such as the WS-AT
conformant framework [2] used in our implementation. For
simplicity, we assume a flat distributed transaction model.
We assume that for each transaction, a distinct coordinator
is created. The lifespan of the coordinator is the same as the
transaction it coordinates.
All transactions are started and terminated by the initia-
tor. The initiator also propagates the transaction to other
participants. The distributed commit protocol is started for
a transaction when a commit/abort request is received from
the initiator. The initiator is regarded as a special partici-
pant. In later discussions we do not distinguish the initiator
and other participants unless it is necessary to do so.
When considering the safety of our distributed com-
mit protocol, we use an asynchronous distributed system
model. However, to ensure liveness, certain synchrony must
be assumed. Similar to [5], we assume that the message
transmission and processing delay has an asymptotic upper
bound. This bound is dynamically explored in the adapted
Byzantine agreement algorithm in that each time a view
change occurs, the timeout for the new view is doubled.
We assume that the transaction coordinator runs sepa-
rately from the participants, and it is replicated. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the participants are not replicated.
We assume that 3f + 1 coordinator replicas are available,
among which at most f can be faulty during a transaction.
There is no limit on the number of faulty participants. Simi-
lar to [5], each coordinator replica is assigned a unique id i,
where i varies from 0 to 3f . For view v, the replica whose id
i satisfies i = v mod (3f + 1) would serve as the primary.
The view starts from 0. For each view change, the view
number is increased by one and a new primary is selected.
In this paper, we call a coordinator replica correct if it
does not fail during the distributed commit for the trans-
action under consideration, i.e., it faithfully executes ac-
cording to the protocol prescribed from the start to the end.
However, we call a participant correct if it is not Byzantine
faulty, i.e., it may be subject to typical non-malicious faults
such as crash faults or performance faults.
The coordinator replicas are subject to Byzantine faults,
i.e., a Byzantine faulty replica can fail arbitrarily. For par-
ticipants, however, only a subset of faulty behaviors are tol-
erated, such as a faulty participant sending conflicting votes
to different coordinator replicas. Some forms of participant
Byzantine behaviors cannot be addressed by the distributed
commit protocol.1
For the initiator, we further limits its Byzantine faulty
behaviors. In particular, it does not exclude any correct par-
ticipant from the scope of the transaction, or include any
participant that has not registered properly with the coordi-
nator replicas, as discussed below.
To ensure atomic termination of a distributed transaction,
it is essential that all correct coordinator replicas agree on
the set of participants involved in the transaction. In this
work, we defer the Byzantine agreement on the participants
set until the distributed commit stage and combine it with
that for the transaction outcome. To facilitate this optimiza-
tion, we need to make the following additional assumptions.
We assume that there is proper authentication mecha-
nism in place to prevent a Byzantine faulty process from
illegally registering itself as a participant at correct coor-
dinator replicas. Furthermore, we assume that a correct
1 For example, a Byzantine faulty participant can vote to commit a
transaction while actually aborting it, and vice versa.
participant registers with f + 1 or more correct coordina-
tor replicas before it sends a reply to the initiator when the
transaction is propagated to this participant with a request
coming from the initiator. If a correct participant crashes
before the transaction is propagated to itself, or before it
finishes registering with the coordinator replicas, either no
reply is sent back to the initiator, or an exception is thrown
back to the initiator. As a result, the initiator should decide
to abort the transaction. The interaction pattern among the
initiator, participants and the coordinator is identical to that
described in the WS-AT specification [4], except that the
coordinator is replicated in this work.
All messages between the coordinator and the partici-
pants are digitally signed. We assume that the coordinator
replicas and the participants each has a public/secret key
pair. The public keys of the participants are known to all
coordinator replicas, and vice versa, while the private key is
kept secret to its owner. We assume that the adversaries
have limited computing power so that they cannot break
the encryption and digital signatures of correct coordinator
replicas.
3.2. BFTDC Protocol
Figure 1 shows the pseudo-code of the our Byzantine
fault tolerant distributed commit protocol. Comparing with
the 2PC protocol, there are two main differences:
– At the coordinator side, an additional phase of Byzan-
tine agreement is needed for the coordinator replicas
to reach a consensus on the outcome of the transaction,
before they notify the participants.
– At the participant side, a decision (commit or abort
request) from a coordinator replica is queued until at
least f+1 identical decision messages have been re-
ceived, unless the participant unilaterally aborts the
transaction. This is to make sure that at least one of
the decision messages come from a correct coordina-
tor replica.
The distributed commit for a transaction starts when a
coordinator replica receives a commit request from the ini-
tiator. If the coordinator replica receives an abort request
from the initiator, it skips the first phase of the distributed
commit. In any case, a Byzantine agreement is conducted
on the decision regarding the transaction’s outcome.
The operations of each coordinator replica is defined in
the BFTDistributedCommit() method in Fig. 1. During the
prepare phase, a coordinator replica sends a prepare request
to every participant in the transaction. The prepare request
is piggybacked with a prepare certificate, which contains
the commit request sent (and signed) by the initiator.
When a participant receives a prepare request from a co-
ordinator replica, it verifies the correctness of the signature
of the message and the prepare certificate (if the partici-
pant does not know the initiator’s public key, this step is
Method: BFTDistributedCommit(CommitRequest)
begin
PrepareCert := CommitRequest;
Append PrepareCert to PrepareRequest;
Multicast PrepareRequest;
VoteLog := CollectVotes();
Add VoteLog to DecisionCert;
decision := ByzantineAgreement(DecisionCert);
if decision = Commit then Multicast CommitRequest;
else Multicast AbortRequest;
Return decision;
end
Method: PrepareTransaction(PrepareRequest)
begin
if VerifySignature(PrepareRequest) = false then
Discard PrepareRequest and return;
if HasPrepareCert(PrepareRequest) = false then
Discard PrepareRequest and return;
if P is willing to commit T then
Log(<Prepared T>) to stable storage;
Send ‘‘prepared’’ to coordinator;
else
Log(<Abort T>); Send ‘‘aborted’’ to coordinator;
end
Method: CommitTransaction(CommitRequest)
begin
if VerifySignature(CommitRequest) = false then
Discard CommitRequest and return;
Append CommitRequest to DecisionLog;
if CanMakeDecision(commit, DecisionLog) then
Log(<Commit T>) to stable storage;
Send ‘‘committed’’ to coordinator;
end
Method: AbortTransaction(AbortRequest)
begin
if VerifySignature(AbortRequest) = false then
Discard AbortRequest and return;
Append AbortRequest to DecisionLog;
if CanMakeDecision(abort, DecisionLog) then
Log(<Abort T>); Abort T locally;
Send ‘‘aborted’’ to coordinator;
end
Method: CanMakeDecision(decision, DecisionLog)
begin
NumOfDecisions := 0;
foreach Message in DecisionLog do
if GetDecision(Message) = decision then
NumOfDecisions++;
if NumOfDecisions >= f+1 then Return true;
else Return false;
end
Figure 1. Pseudo-code for our Byzantine fault
tolerant distributed commit protocol.
skipped). The prepare request is discarded if any of the veri-
fication steps fails. Even though the check for a prepare cer-
tificate is not essential to the correctness of our distributed
commit protocol, it nevertheless can prevent a faulty coordi-
nator replica from instructing some participants to prepare
a transaction, even after the initiator has requested to abort
the transaction.
At the end of the prepare phase, all correct coordinator
replicas engage in an additional round for them to reach
a Byzantine agreement on the outcome of the transaction.
The Byzantine agreement algorithm used in this phase is
elaborated in Section 3.3.
When a participant receives a commit request from a co-
ordinator replica, it commits the transaction only if it has
received the same decision from f other replicas so that at
least one of them comes from a correct replica. The han-
dling of an abort request is similar.
3.3. Byzantine Agreement Algorithm
The Byzantine agreement algorithm used in the BFTDC
protocol is adapted from the BFT algorithm by Castro and
Liskov [5]. To avoid possible confusion with the terms used
to refer to the distributed commit protocol, the three phases
during normal operations are referred to as ba-pre-prepare,
ba-prepare, and ba-commit. Our algorithm differs from the
BFT algorithm in a number of places due to different objec-
tives. The BFT algorithm is used for server replicas to agree
on the total ordering of the requests received, while our al-
gorithm is used for the coordinator replicas to agree on the
outcome (and participants set) of each transaction. In our al-
gorithm, the ba-pre-prepare message is used to bind a deci-
sion (to commit or abort) with the transaction under concern
(represented by a unique transaction id). In [5], the ba-pre-
prepare message is used to bind a request with an execution
order (represented by a unique sequence number). Further-
more, for distributed commit, an instance of our algorithm
is created and executed for each transaction. When there are
multiple concurrent transactions, multiple instances of our
algorithm are running concurrently and independently from
each other (the relative ordering of the distributed commit
for different transactions is not important). In [5], however,
a single instance of the BFT algorithm is used for all re-
quests to be ordered.
When a replica completes the prepare phase of the dis-
tributed commit for a transaction, an instance of our Byzan-
tine agreement algorithm is created. The algorithm starts
with the ba-pre-prepare phase. During this phase, the pri-
mary p sends a ba-pre-prepare message including its de-
cision certificate to all other replicas. The ba-pre-prepare
message has the form <BA-PRE-PREPARE, v, t, o, C>σp ,
where v is the current view number, t is the transaction
id, o is the proposed transaction outcome (i.e., commit or
abort), C is the decision certificate, and σp is the signature
of the message signed by the primary. The decision certifi-
cate contains a collection of records, one for each partici-
pant. The record for a participant j contains a signed reg-
istration Rj = (t, j)σj and a signed vote Vj = (t, vote)σj
for the transaction t, if a vote from j has been received by
the primary. The transaction id is included in each registra-
tion and vote record so that a faulty primary cannot reuse
an obsolete registration or vote record to force a transac-
tion outcome against the will of some correct participants
(which may lead to non-atomic transaction commit).
A backup accepts a ba-pre-prepare message provided:
– The message is signed properly by the primary. The
replica is in view v, and it is handling transaction t.
– It has not accepted a ba-pre-prepared message for
transaction t in view v.
– The registration records in C are identical to, or form
a superset of, the local registration records.
– Every vote record in C is properly signed by its send-
ing participant and the transaction identifier in the
record matches that of the current transaction, and the
proposed decision o is consistent with the registration
and vote records.
Note that a backup does not insist on receiving a decision
certificate identical to its local copy. This is because a cor-
rect primary might have received a registration from a par-
ticipant which the backup has not, or the primary and back-
ups might have received different votes from some Byzan-
tine faulty participants, or the primary might have received
a vote that a backup has not received if the sending partici-
pant crashed right after it has sent its vote to the primary.
If the registration records in C form a superset of the lo-
cal registration records, the backup updates its registration
records and asks the primary replica for the endpoint ref-
erence2 of each missing participant (so that it can send its
notification to the participant).
A backup suspects the primary and initiates a view
change immediately if the ba-pre-prepare message fails the
verification. Otherwise, the backup accepts the ba-pre-
prepare message. At this point, we say the replica has ba-
pre-prepared for transaction t. It then logs the accepted ba-
pre-prepare message and multicasts a ba-prepare message
with the same decision o as that in the ba-pre-prepare mes-
sage (this starts the ba-prepare phase). The ba-prepare mes-
sage takes the form <BA-PREPARE, v, t, d, o, i>σi , where d
is the digest of the decision certificate C.
A coordinator replica j accepts a ba-prepare message
provided:
– The message is correctly signed by replica i, and
replica j is in view v and the current transaction is t;
– The decision o matches that in the ba-pre-prepare mes-
sage;
– The digest d matches the digest of the decision certifi-
cate in the accepted ba-pre-prepare message.
If a replica has collected 2f matching ba-prepare mes-
sages from different replicas (including the replica’s own
ba-prepare message if it is a backup), the replica is said to
have ba-prepared to make a decision on transaction t. This
is the end of the ba-prepare phase.
A ba-prepared replica enters the ba-commit phase by
multicasting a ba-commit message to all other repli-
cas. The ba-commit message has the form <BA-
COMMIT, v, t, d, o, i>σi . The replica i is said to have ba-
committed, if it has obtained 2f + 1 matching ba-commit
2The term endpoint reference refers to the physical contact information
such as host and port of a process. In Web services, an endpoint reference
typically contains a URL to a service and an identifier used by the service
to locate the specific handler object [9].
messages from different replicas (including the message it
has sent). When a replica is ba-committed for transaction t,
it sends the decision o to all participants of transaction t.
If a replica i could not advance to the ba-committed state
until a timeout, it initiates a view change by sending a view
change message to all other replicas. The view change mes-
sage has the form<VIEW-CHANGE, v+1, t, P, i>σi , where
P contains information regarding its current state. If the
replica has ba-pre-prepared t in view v, it includes a tuple
<v, t, o, C>. If it has ba-prepared t in view v, it includes
both the tuple <v, t, o, C> and 2f matching ba-prepared
messages from different replicas for t obtained in view v.
If the replica has not ba-pre-prepared t, it includes its own
decision certificate C.
A correct replica that has not timed out the current view
multicasts a view change message only if it is in view v and
it has received valid view change messages for view v + 1
from f + 1 different replicas. This is to prevent a faulty
replica from inducing unnecessary view changes. A view
change message is regarded as valid if it is for view v + 1
and the ba-pre-prepare and ba-prepare information included
in P , if any, is for transaction t in a view up to v.
When the primary for view v + 1 receives 2f + 1
valid view change messages for v + 1 (including the one
it has sent or would have sent), it installs the new view,
and multicasts a new view message, in the form <NEW-
VIEW, v + 1, V, t, o, C> for view v + 1, where V contains
2f + 1 tuples for the view change messages received for
view v + 1. Each tuple has the form <i, d>, where i is
the sending replica, and d is the digest of the view change
message. The proposed decision o for t and the decision
certification C are determined according to the following
rules:
1. If the new primary has received a view change message
containing a valid ba-prepare record for t, and there is
no conflicting ba-prepare record, it uses that decision.
2. Else, the new primary rebuilds a set of registration
records from the received view change messages. This
new set may be identical to, or a superset of, the regis-
tration set known to the new primary prior to the view
change. The new primary then rebuilds a set of vote
records in a similar manner. It is possible that conflict-
ing vote records are found from the same participant
(i.e., , a participant sent a “prepared” vote to one co-
ordinator replica, while sending an “aborted” vote to
some other replicas), in which case, a decision has to
be made on the direction of the transaction t. In this
work, we choose to take the “prepared” vote to maxi-
mize the commit rate. A new decision certificate will
be constructed and a decision for t’s outcome is pro-
posed accordingly. They will be included in the new
view message for view v + 1.
When a backup receives the new view message, it veri-
fies the message basically by following the same steps used
by the primary. If the replica accepts the new view message,
it may need to retrieve the endpoint references for some par-
ticipants that it did not receive from other correct replicas.
When a backup replica has accepted the new view message
and obtained all missing information, it sends a ba-prepare
message to all other replicas. The algorithm then proceeds
according to its normal operations.
3.4. Informal Proof of Correctness
We now provide an informal proof of the safety of our
Byzantine agreement algorithm and the distributed commit
protocol. Due to space limitation, the proof for liveness is
omitted.
Claim 1: If a correct coordinator replica ba-commits
a transaction t with a commit decision, the registration
records of all correct participants must have been included
in the decision certificate, and all such participants must
have voted to commit the transaction.
We prove by contradiction. Assume that there exists a
correct participant p whose registration is left out of the de-
cision certificate. Since a correct coordinator replica has ba-
committed t with a commit decision, it must have accepted
a ba-pre-prepare message and 2f matching ba-prepare mes-
sage from different replicas. This means that a set R1 of
2f + 1 replicas have all accepted the same decision cer-
tificate without the participant p, the initiator has requested
the coordinator replicas to commit t, and every participant
in the registration set has voted to commit the transaction.
This further implies that the initiator has received normal
replies from all participants, including p, to which it has
propagated the current transaction. Because the participant
p is correct and responded to the initiator’s request prop-
erly, it must have registered with at least 2f +1 coordinator
replicas prior to sending its reply to the initiator. Among the
2f+1 coordinator replicas, at least a set R2 of f+1 replicas
are correct, i.e., all replicas in R2 are correct and have the
registration record for p prior to the start of the distributed
commit for t. Because the total number of replicas is 3f+1,
the two sets R1 and R2 must intersect in at least one correct
replica. The correct replica in the intersection either did not
receive the registration from p, or it has accepted a decision
certificate without the registration record for p despite the
fact that it has received the registration from p, which is im-
possible. Therefore, all correct participants must have been
included in the decision certificate if any correct replica ba-
committed a transaction with a commit decision.
We next prove that if any correct replica ba-committed
a transaction with a commit decision, all correct partici-
pants must have voted to commit the transaction. Again,
we prove by contradiction. Assume that the above state-
ment is not true, and a correct participant q has voted to
abort the transaction t. Since we have proved above that
q’s registration record must have been included in the de-
cision certificate, its vote cannot be ignored. Furthermore,
since a correct replica ba-committed t with a commit de-
cision, the set R1 of 2f + 1 replicas have all accepted the
commit decision. Again, since R1 and R2 must intersect
by at least one correct replica, that replica both accepted the
commit decision and has received the “aborted” vote from
q. This is possible only if the ba-pre-prepare message that
the replica has accepted contains a “prepared” vote from q.
This contradict to the fact that q is a correct participant. A
correct participant never sends conflicting votes to different
coordinator replicas. This concludes our proof for claim 1.
Claim 2: Our Byzantine agreement algorithm ensures
that all correct coordinator replicas agree on the same de-
cision regarding the outcome of a transaction.
We prove by contradiction. Assume that two correct
replicas i and j reach different decisions for t, without loss
of generality, assume i decides to abort t in a view v and j
decides to commit t in a view u.
First, we consider the case when v = u. According to
our algorithm, i must have accepted a ba-pre-prepare mes-
sage with an abort decision supported by a decision certifi-
cate, and 2f matching ba-prepare messages from different
replicas, all in view v, this means a set R3 of at least 2f +1
replicas have ba-prepared t with an abort decision in view
v. Similarly, replica j must have accepted a ba-pre-prepare
message with a commit decision supported by a decision
certificate, and 2f matching ba-prepare messages from dif-
ferent replicas for transaction t in the same view v, which
means a set R4 of at least 2f + 1 replicas have ba-prepared
t with a commit decision in view v. Since there are only
3f + 1 replicas, the two sets R3 and R4 must intersect in at
least f + 1 replicas, among which, at least one is a correct
replica. It means that this replica must have accepted two
conflicting ba-pre-prepare messages (one to commit and the
other to abort) in the same view. This contradicts the fact
that it is a correct replica.
Next, we consider the case when view u > v. Since
replica i ba-committed with an abort decision for t in view
v, it must have received 2f + 1 matching ba-commit mes-
sages from different replicas (including the one sent by it-
self). This means that a set R5 of 2f + 1 replicas have
ba-prepared t in view v, all with the same decision to abort
t. To install a new view, the primary of the new view must
have received view change messages (including the one it
has sent or would have sent) from a set R6 of 2f + 1 repli-
cas. Similar to the previous argument, the two sets R5 and
R6 intersect in at least f +1 replicas, among which, at least
one must be a correct replica. This replica would have in-
cluded the decision and the decision certificate backed by
the ba-pre-prepare message and the 2f matching ba-prepare
messages it has received from other replicas, in its view
change message. The primary in the new view, if it is cor-
rect, must have used the decision and decision certificate
from this replica. This should have led all correct replicas to
ba-commit transaction t with an abort decision, which con-
tradicts to the assumption that a correct replica committed
t. If the primary is faulty and did not obey the new view
construction rule, we argue that no correct replica could
have accepted the new view message, let alone to have ba-
committed t with a commit decision. Recall that a correct
replica should verify the new view message by following
the new view construction rules, just as a correct primary
would do. We have proved above that the 2f + 1 view
change messages must contain one sent by a correct replica
with ba-prepare information for an abort decision. A correct
replica cannot possibly have accepted the new view mes-
sage sent by the faulty primary, which contains a conflict-
ing decision. This contradicts to the initial assumption that
a correct replica j committed transaction t in view u. The
proof for the case when v > u is similar. Therefore, claim
2 is correct.
Claim 3: The BFTDC protocol guarantees atomic termi-
nation of transactions at all correct participants.
We prove by contradiction. Assume that a transaction t
commits at a participant p but aborts at another participant
q. According to the criteria indicated in the CommitTrans-
action() method shown in Fig. 1, p commits the transaction
t only if it has received the commit request from at least
f+1 different coordinator replicas. Since at most f replicas
are faulty, at least one request comes from a correct replica.
Due to claim 1, if any correct replica ba-committed a trans-
action with a commit decision, then the registration records
of all correct participants must have been included in the
decision certificate, and all correct participants must have
voted to commit the transaction.
On the other hand, since q aborted t, one of the following
two scenarios must be true: (1) q unilaterally aborted t, in
which case, it must not have sent a “prepared” vote to any
coordinator replica. (2) q received a prepare request, pre-
pared t, sent a “prepared” vote to one or more coordinator
replicas. But it received an abort request from at least f +1
different coordinator replicas.
If the first scenario is true, q might or might not have
finished its registration process. If it did not, the initiator
would have been notified by an exception, or would have
timed out q. In any case, the initiator should have decided
to abort t. This conflicts with the fact that p has committed
t because it implies that the initiator has asked the coordi-
nator replicas to commit t. If q completed the registration
process, its registration record should have been aware by a
set R7 of at least f+1 correct replicas. Since p has commit-
ted t, at least one correct replica has ba-committed t with a
commit decision, which in turn implies that a set R8 of at
least 2f + 1 coordinator replicas have accepted a ba-pre-
prepare message with a decision certificate either has no q
in its registration records, or without q’s “prepared” vote.
Since there are 3f + 1 replicas, R7 and R8 must intersect
in at least one replica. This correct replica could not possi-
bly have accepted a ba-pre-prepare message with a decision
certificate described above.
For the second scenario, at least one correct replica has
decided to abort t. Since another participant p committed
t, at least one correct replica has decided to commit t. This
contradicts to claim 2, which we have proved to be true.
Therefore, claim 3 is correct.
4. Implementation and Performance
We have implemented the BFTDC protocol (with the ex-
ception of the view change mechanisms) and integrated it
into a distributed commit framework for Web services in
Java programming language. The extended framework is
based on a number of Apache Web services projects, includ-
ing Kandula (an implementation of WS-AT) [2], WSS4J
(an implementation of the Web Services Security Specifi-
cation) [3], and Apache Axis (SOAP Engine) [1]. Most of
the mechanisms are implemented in terms of Axis handlers
that can be plugged into the framework without affecting
other components. Some of the Kandula code is modified
to enable the control of its internal state, to enable a Byzan-
tine agreement on the transaction outcome, and to enable
voting. Due to space constraint, the implementation details
are omitted.
For performance evaluation, we focus on assessing the
runtime overhead of our BFTDC protocol during normal
operations. Our experiment is carried out on a testbed con-
sisting of 20 Dell SC1420 servers connected by a 100Mbps
Ethernet. Each server is equipped with two Intel Xeon
2.8GHz processors and 1GB memory running SuSE 10.2
Linux.
The test application is a simple banking Web services
application where a bank manager (i.e., initiator) transfers
funds among the participants within the scope of a dis-
tributed transaction for each request received from a client.
The coordinator-side services are replicated on 4 nodes to
tolerate a single Byzantine faulty replica. The initiator and
other participants are not replicated, and run on distinct
nodes. The clients are distributed evenly (whenever pos-
sible) among the remaining nodes. Each client invokes a
fund transfer operation on the banking Web service within
a loop without any “think” time between two consecutive
calls. In each run, 1000 samples are obtained. The end-
to-end latency for the fund transfer operation is measured
at the client. The latency for the distributed commit and
the Byzantine agreement is measured at the coordinator
replicas. Finally, the throughput of the distributed commit
framework is measured at the initiator for various number
of participants and concurrent clients.
To evaluate the runtime overhead of our protocol, we
compare the performance of our BFTDC protocol with the
2PC protocol as it is implemented in the WS-AT framework
with the exception that all messages exchanged over the net-
work are digitally signed.
In Figure 2(a), we included the distributed commit la-
tency and the end-to-end latency for both our protocol (in-
dicated by “with bft”) and the original 2PC protocol (indi-
cated by “no bft”). The Byzantine agreement latency is also
shown. Figure 2(b) shows the throughput measurement re-
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Figure 2. (a) Various latency measurements for transactions with different number of participants
under normal operations (with a single client). (b) Throughput of the distributed commit service
in terms of transactions per second for transactions with different number of participants under
different load.
sults for transactions using our protocol with up to 10 con-
currently running clients and 2-10 participants in each trans-
action. For comparison, the throughput for transactions us-
ing the 2PC protocol for 2 participants is also included.
As can be seen in Figure 2(a), the latency for the dis-
tributed commit and the end-to-end latency both are in-
creased by about 200-400 ms when the number of partici-
pants varies from 2 to 10. This increase is mostly attributed
to the introduction of the Byzantine agreement phase in our
protocol. Percentage-wise, the end-to-end latency, as per-
ceived by an end user, is increased by only 20% to 30%,
which is quite moderate. We observe a similar range of
throughput reductions for transactions using our protocol,
as shown in Figure 2(b).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a Byzantine fault tolerant dis-
tributed commit protocol. We carefully studied the types
of Byzantine faults that might occur to a distributed trans-
actional systems and identified the subset of faults that a
distributed commit protocol can handle. We adapted Cas-
tro and Liskov’s BFT algorithm to ensure Byzantine agree-
ment on the outcome of transactions. We also proved infor-
mally the correctness of our BFTDC protocol. A working
prototype of the protocol is built on top of an open source
distributed commit framework for Web services. The mea-
surement results of our protocol show only moderate run-
time overhead. We are currently working on the implemen-
tation of the view change mechanisms and exploring addi-
tional mechanisms to protect a TP monitor against Byzan-
tine faults, not only for distributed commit, but for activa-
tion, registration, and transaction propagation as well.
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